Pages 1 - 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Rita F. Lin, Judge

NEETA THAKUR, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

VS. NO. 3:25-cv-04737-RFL

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his) official capacity as President) of the United States, et al.,)

Defendants.

San Francisco, California Monday, June 9, 2025

TRANSCRIPT OF REMOTE VIDEOCONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES: (Appearances via Zoom.)

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Monday - June 9, 2025 1 11:09 a.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 MR. ALTABET: The United States District Court for the 4 5 Northern District of California is now in session. Honorable Rita F. Lin presiding. 6 Just a reminder to everyone before we get started, 7 these proceedings are being reported and recorded by this 8 Court, any other recording of this proceeding either by video, 9 10 audio, including screen shots, or other copying of the hearing, is strictly prohibited. 11 Calling Civil Case 25-4737, Thakur, et al., versus 12 Trump, et al. 13 Counsel, please state your appearances for the record, 14 15 beginning with the plaintiffs. MS. CABRASER: Good morning, Your Honor. Elizabeth 16 Cabraser of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein for the Thakur 17 plaintiffs. 18 MR. HEIMANN: Good morning, Your Honor. 19 Richard 20 Heimann, also from Lieff Cabraser. 21 MR. BUDNER: Good morning, Your Honor. Kevin Budner 22 also from Lieff Cabraser. 23 MR. SCHOENBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. 24 Schoenberg from Farella, Braun & Martell for the plaintiffs.

MS. POLSKY: Good morning, Your Honor. Claudia Polsky

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from U.C. Berkeley School of Law also for the plaintiffs.

MR. ALTABET: Good morning, Your Honor. Jason Altabet on behalf of the United States.

THE COURT: Good morning to all of you. And thank you for your submission earlier this morning of the stipulation and proposed order which addresses one of the main scheduling concerns that I wanted to discuss today. I appreciate that you all are already working hard and working together to make this run smoothly; so thank you for that.

Before we get too far down the road, I did have a disclosure I wanted to make. I do have a relative who teaches in the University of California system who might potentially be a member of a proposed class.

Prior to class certification, the rules are very clear that this would obviously not be a basis for recusal.

Obviously, this comes up frequently in the class action context that members of the judge's family may be members of a proposed class, and so I am not recusing on that basis.

In the event that I do certify a class, I would exclude that person from the scope of the class which, again should obviate the issue. But I -- out of an abundance of caution, I just wanted to disclose it to the parties so you know about it.

MS. CABRASER: Your Honor -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

THE COURT: Please, go ahead.

MS. CABRASER: Apologies for interrupting the Court.

We certainly recognize that situation. It does come up not infrequently, and typically the solution is to exclude interested persons or relatives from the class; and always, of course, to exclude judicial officers and their staff members from the class.

THE COURT: Exactly. My point is to just follow that standard practice.

So just moving to the next topic I wanted to cover, I intend to grant the stipulation that you all submitted with respect to the case schedule. I'm also granting the plaintiffs' request for 50 pages for the TRO motion that you filed. That's fine. I'm going to set the opposition page limit at 50 pages also for the response, and the reply at 30 pages. Obviously, there's a lot of complex issues in this case, and I want to make sure you all get a full and fair hearing on those. And otherwise, I'll set the schedule that you all proposed.

The next topic I wanted to discuss was the question of fact development and whether it would make sense for the Court to order some kind of expedited production of a limited portion of the administrative record, whether there's other fact development on the non-APA claims that the parties believe should be expedited in some way. So I'm open to hearing from the parties on the proposal on that.

I'll start with plaintiffs, and then I can hear from the Government.

MS. CABRASER: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Heimann will address that issue.

MR. HEIMANN: Thank you, Elizabeth.

Your Honor, we actually have not had any in-depth discussion as yet with the Government over the question of early discovery. The issue was raised -- and I think the way you framed it in your initial order was whether or not the parties believed that discovery is necessary to a resolution of the injunction issues.

And I think our position was that it's probably not necessary, but might very well be helpful to the Court. And with that in mind, we tried, on the plaintiffs' side, to fashion a limited form of discovery that might be useful; and I can outline the contours of that if that would be helpful.

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. HEIMANN: Good.

So -- and first off, we would contemplate limiting our discovery to four agencies, rather than the some 15 or so that are in play in the complaint. And those four would be the three that are identified and discussed in some detail in the complaint, and also the FDA which is discussed in the motion for preliminary injunction -- or TRO as it was. So that would be the first limitation.

The second limitation is that -- a matter of time.

We're talking about a period of roughly three to three and a half months that are critical, beginning with the obvious inauguration date of January 20, if I've got that correct in mind. So that would be a second limitation on the scope of the discovery.

And then what we would be focusing on in terms of document discovery would be the obvious; that is to say, the documents within each agency that reflect the process that was engaged in selecting grants for review, and then the process that was engaged in for the decision-making about cancelling of the grants.

In addition to those two areas, we would also be looking to discover the communications, if any, between each of the agencies and DOGE, with respect to the subject matter in question, and also communications between the each of the agencies and the White House, if there were any, with respect to the executive orders and with respect to the subject matter of the cancellation.

Beyond that, we had contemplated the possibility of a 30(b)(6) deposition for each of the agencies, but I'm thinking that it might be wiser to hold off on our requesting that until we see what the documents show with respect to the decision-making process, and how detailed the documentation is, to allow us to understand exactly what happened with respect to

each of the agencies and the cancellation of the grants.

So that's -- that's an outline, if you will, of the scope of discovery that we were thinking about. Since we haven't talked with the Government about it, we have no idea, although I can anticipate what their reaction will be, but I would be hopeful, given the limitations on the discovery that we're talking about, that if Your Honor were to grant it, it would be on a very short time frame; that is to say, we're talking about documents that we imagine are very limited in terms of numbers and scope.

We anticipate that the personnel at each of the agencies that was involved in this matter is going to be limited as well, and so one would hope that the documents we're talking about could be promptly produced if Your Honor were to order them to produce the documents.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the Government and your thoughts.

MR. ALTABET: So, Your Honor, I guess, just to start,
I think the point that plaintiffs were not originally
necessarily contemplating discovery when they filed the motion,
I think, is a helpful frame here when we think about, you know,
opposition is due on Thursday and hearing is a week from
Friday. It's a long complaint with a lot of documents and a
very long motion for TRO and motion for class certification.

I don't think the issues that are in play for the

emergency motion require any of this discovery. So Your Honor pointed out two topics: A procedure for termination and the effect of the executive orders.

The Government, in the emergency motion context, is not planning to contest the idea that policy priorities are setting termination decisions. And so I think that's -- this case is being litigated on the basis that agency funding priorities have changed in part based on executive orders; and some of the documents they've submitted reference the executive order specifically, and that the Government is generally terminating grants pursuant to the termination regulations and the terms and conditions of contracts or for government convenience.

So I don't know that any of the discovery discussed would actually affect the legal history here, especially the threshold legal issues like whether plaintiffs lack standing, whether the Court of Federal Claims is the proper venue for this, and the other generalized legal arguments there.

So I think, just to start, that -- the emergency motions itself in the complaint don't seem to necessarily contemplate the need for discovery on this timeline.

I'll also add that given that this is generally understood as an administrative record case, I think, if there were to be any discovery, it would be for a very limited portion of the administrative record. And I think it really

should just be based on how this case is being litigated right now just as to the named plaintiffs.

I think, at this juncture, what we can wrap our heads around and what we can wrap our hands around is the grant decisions as to the six named plaintiffs who plaintiffs have alleged are common and typical to a larger class. And so I don't think, generally looking at three to three and a half months of documents within an agency on sort of generalized grounds is going to be particularly helpful here.

And I'll just conclude that I don't think that communications from folks in the White House are part of plaintiffs' claims in a way where such discovery would make sense. As I sort of previously discussed, I think the idea that policy priorities are setting terminations is uncontested at this juncture, and so I don't see how that would actually affect at least any of the relief plaintiffs are asking for which is for certain grant agreements to be sort of specifically enforced against the Government.

THE COURT: One question I have for Mr. Altabet is: I hear you saying that the Government doesn't intend to contest that grant priorities are what drove the termination decisions in this case; but, of course, some of the claims are based on the concept that there were specific priorities that were driving the termination decisions as to specific grants involving the named plaintiffs, for example First Amendment

claim alleging that there was viewpoint discrimination in the selection of certain grants for termination.

At the same time, the termination letters don't necessarily specify what the reason was specifically other than to say, just in general, that the grant was not found to match agency priorities.

So in assessing that claim, it seems to me, both from a preliminary injunction perspective and a class certification perspective, useful to understand what the process is for the Government to make these decisions about which grants were terminated and why.

So maybe that is part of the administrative record; that is, the Government's record of its decision-making as to whether it terminated particular individual grants, whether there was a memo or some other mechanism for tracking who was terminated for what reason. That seems to me like something that it should be -- unless you don't plan to contest that; unless you plan to agree that these were terminated based on -- or stipulate that certain grants were terminated based on particular executive orders. Then that would obviate the discovery in that instance.

But if you're not planning to stipulate on that, it seems that it would be useful at least to have the administrative record that ties the particular terminations for the named plaintiffs, at the very least, to the reasons for

those terminations, and to the particular executive orders at issue, and what the general process was so I could see if that's a classwide issue or not.

So I'm curious to hear what your response to that is, and if the Government is indeed intending to contest those sorts of questions.

MR. ALTABET: So at the emergency motion context, my understanding -- I'm in the middle of writing the brief and there's only been one business day since the TRO was sent to in the agencies, so I'm still collecting responses.

But as of now, our plan is to argue, as we have in the lot of grant-funded cases where there has not been discovery at the PI phase, is that the Government is permitted to select grants based on what the Government wants to promote and not promote. So I don't think our legal argument is based on saying any particular grant -- you know: Oh, well, this one over here wasn't for viewpoint, it was for this, versus that.

I think we're saying that the Government is permitted to say it wants to promote something that is in one executive order; and maybe an executive order says we don't want to promote something else. And I think at least one or more of the named plaintiffs' grant termination notices references executive orders for purposes of that.

So I don't think on the way this is being litigated, at this juncture, it's necessary. Our argument is we're

allowed to decide on promotion.

THE COURT: And if I were to disagree with that argument, you're not intending to, then, present an argument that there's a question as to whether -- or that plaintiffs have somehow failed their burden to show that these particular grant terminations were based on the executive orders that are listed in the complaint.

MR. ALTABET: Our plan is to note that these executive orders are setting policy priorities for the Executive Branch and that the Federal Government has the right to rely on those policy priorities when terminating.

So I think that answers Your Honor's question, which is -- I think, later on, outside of this context, maybe, if there is, in fact, a class certified or we're discussing commonality or typicality, maybe at that point we're discussing how many were due to one thing versus another thing.

And that, in part, I think, will depend on

Your Honor's view over whether -- which claims could survive in
this context at all. If, for example, only the First Amendment
claim were to survive, or Your Honor thinks that's the only one
likely to succeed, then probably we need to discuss: Okay.

Well, let's look at the process and see which ones were
terminated based on that -- a method that Your Honor has
concluded is likely to succeed on the method -- on the merits,
if that makes sense.

THE COURT: So I just want to make sure I understand the Government's position.

So at the preliminary injunction phase, it is not the Government's intention to argue that the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed because they haven't shown that these particular terminations are the result of the agency priority changes described in the executive order cited in the complaint.

Is that accurate?

MR. ALTABET: Yes. We are planning to agree that certain -- that some -- one or more grants from plaintiffs or the plaintiffs' class were based on these policy priorities, including what's set up in the executive orders; and, in fact, we'll cite the executive orders noting the policy priorities.

THE COURT: Thank you. That helps clarify and, maybe, take a little bit of the time pressure off in terms of early fact development.

Let me give Mr. Heimann an opportunity to respond if there's anything else you think I should know or whether you think I should set a date for the parties to make a proposal for early fact development. And maybe it's not fact development that has to happen at the preliminary injunction stage, but rather that the Court should put the case on a --more of an accelerated timeline as we head into the regular merits stage of the case.

MR. HEIMANN: I don't know that I have anything more to add other than the suggestion that it might be useful, now that we've finalized or prioritized what we think use useful discovery to be, to have a conversation with the Government over what that would mean if, in fact, Your Honor where were to direct them to respond to what we're talking about in terms of discovery. And I'm hopeful that we could have that conversation today or tomorrow, and maybe make some progress and report back to the Court then.

THE COURT: That sound great.

What does the Government think about that timeline?

MR. ALTABET: I think it would be helpful to discuss with plaintiffs today and tomorrow what sort of -- yeah -- any discovery would look like.

I think, the one request I would have, if Your Honor could provide guidance on whether you agree with the view that three or four agencies would be the focus of any early discovery, whether in the preliminary injunction phase or otherwise, the ones that we have sort of fully developed claims for, that is EPA, NEH, NSF, and then the one declaration related to FDA.

I do think, to the extent that's early discovery, keeping it manageable in that way would be, I think, of a great help in helping to frame the legal issues here.

THE COURT: I think that that's makes sense in

limiting it in the way that plaintiffs have proposed,
especially if the plan is to get the discovery done prior to
the June 20th hearing date. So we'd be looking at producing
the discovery June 16th or maybe 17th at the latest. So it's a
quick turnaround in order for you all to be able to look at it
and provide it to the Court.

But maybe there's a way to do it that's more limited, more like a limited administrative record-type of discovery or a little bit beyond that. But I'll let you all meet and confer about that.

Why don't you submit a stipulation and proposed order to me about discovery by Wednesday, June 11th. And then, I can order it, but be prepared that it will be on a short timeline.

We'll try and look at it as soon as we get it.

MR. ALTABET: And, Your Honor, can I ask one more question?

Based on the discussion so far, I -- what would be the topic of the discovery?

So assuming that the Government does not contest that policy priorities are being set for the purpose of the viewpoint portion, I'm not sure what else that plaintiffs have discussed would be worth doing discovery for before the preliminary injunction.

So I know there's a stipulation -- the Government might oppose discovery, that is to say, and not have a

stipulation.

THE COURT: Part of the question I have is whether I have enough to assess class certification as to the non-APA claims. I understand the argument about class certification as to arbitrary and capricious, that these are all sort of similar in that the termination form letter seemed quite similar. But I have a question as to the decision-making process and to determining who is in and out of the class as to the non-APA claims, for example, the First Amendment claim.

So I am curious to see what the parties have to provide the Court about the -- the way in which we would know which plaintiffs are in or -- which putative class members are in or out of the class on the First Amendment claim, or what the processes were for determining who in the -- in the group of folks who had grants were and weren't terminated for reasons that were associated with the executive priorities.

I think that might be helpful, but I'm not sure it's necessary for the reasons that you all have identified.

I will say that if you don't have a stipulation and proposed order on Wednesday you can also submit a joint statement with each of your proposals for the Court, and I'll just rule on the papers in terms of what discovery is appropriate.

Anything else I can address for the parties before we conclude today? I'll start with the plaintiffs and then I'll

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give the Government an opportunity.
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              MR. HEIMANN: Just a quick question on procedure.
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     What time on Wednesday should we be submitting? I have your
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     standing order. I think, it's 5:00.
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              THE COURT:
                          5:00 is my normal deadline standing order.
              MR. HEIMANN: All right.
                                        Fine.
                                               Thanks.
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              MS. CABRASER: And I think that's it on behalf of
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    plaintiffs, Your Honor, other than to note that service of
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     process has gone out pursuant to the summons as soon as the
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     summons was issued. That was -- was set in motion and all
     documents have been -- are out for service on all of the
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     defendants.
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              THE COURT: I did see that. Thank you for the update.
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              MR. ALTABET: Nothing else from the Government,
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     Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Great.
                                  Thank you. Be well.
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              MR. ALTABET: Court is in recess.
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                  (Proceedings adjourned at 11:31 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Monday, June 9, 2025 DATE: Kuth home to Ruth Levine Ekhaus, RMR, RDR, FCRR, CCG, CSR No. 12219 Official Reporter, U.S. District Court