UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Rita F. Lin, Judge

NEETA THAKUR, et al., )
Plaintiffs, )

vs. ) No. 3:25-cv-04737-RFL

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., )

Defendants.

San Francisco, California

Tuesday, August 26, 2025

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

### HELD VIA ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE

#### APPEARANCES:

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(Appearances continued on the following page)

REPORTED BY: April Wood Brott, CSR No. 13782, Official United States Reporter

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2	For Defendants:	
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Tuesday - August 26, 2025

1:31 P.M.

## REMOTE PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: This court is now in session, the Honorable Rita F. Lin presiding. Calling Civil Case Number 25-4737, Neeta Thakur, et al. vs. Donald J. Trump, et al.

Will counsel please state your appearances for the record, starting with Plaintiffs' counsel.

MS. CABRASER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Elizabeth Cabraser of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein for Plaintiffs.

Also with me is co-counsel.

MR. CHEMERINSKY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Erwin Chemerinsky for the plaintiffs.

MR. ALTABET: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jason Altabet on behalf of the United States along with my co-counsel, who will introduce herself.

MS. BARRAGAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Kat Barragan on behalf of the United States.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you. I put out some questions before the hearing.

Let's just start with Plaintiffs' request. I got a letter brief, as you all know, from the plaintiffs proposing to further amend the complaint to add NIH as a plaintiff in this -- or to add a representative or a class to represent folks who had grants terminated at NIH, and then I also received a letter

brief from the defendants later that evening contesting that issue.

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So I want to just start with that issue, and let me just start with Plaintiffs. Obviously since we're past the deadline by which amendment to pleadings would normally be permitted under the existing case schedule, the test is good cause. So what is Plaintiffs' showing for good cause for not adding representative plaintiffs for the NIH defendants within the prior deadline?

MS. CABRASER: Thank you, Your Honor. I will address that for Plaintiffs.

The catalyzing event was the July 31st form letter suspending UCLA NIH grants. There was one letter sent to the chancellor at UCLA attaching a list of 500 suspended NIH grants, and that occurred nearly two weeks after our July 18th deadline.

Before that date, we had assumed, based on our review of the pleadings, that the NIH grants were covered by other litigation, NIH litigation, that was pending. We learned after the suspension that that action did not include an ongoing preliminary injunction like this court has issued.

It did not -- it only included a specified list of NIH grants and thus did not cover this suit. We investigated that matter to assure ourselves of that. We were approached by a number of NIH researchers who had gotten a stop work order on

August 1st, and so we spent the intervening time since then investigating the matter.

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We obtained detailed declarations from three NIH suspended grant researchers who agreed to serve as additional plaintiffs and class representatives, and confirmed with the California Attorney General that proceeding in this matter by amending our complaint to add those plaintiffs with respect to the form suspension letter would not interfere with that case.

I think -- I hope -- we have spent the intervening time wisely. We could not have known on July 18th that this was going to occur, and, in fact, we learned of it several days after that August 31st -- I'm sorry -- August 1st -- I'm sorry, it's July 31st -- letter was sent out. So we have acted with diligence, and I think we've acted as quickly as we reasonably could have under the circumstances and hope that the Court will allow us to file an amended complaint.

I will note that NIH, the National Institutes of Health, has been named as a defendant from the outset of the filing of this action. It was a named defendant in the original complaint, the complaint that was amended on July 18th.

What we are now doing is adding, specifically adding proposed representatives who have been directly impacted by the suspension action to serve as the representatives for NIH suspension class following the process and format that this court has used in its earlier orders.

THE COURT: So let me just confirm then as to the three new class representatives that you mentioned proposing who had grants terminate by NIH. Were each of those grants terminated or suspended after the deadline for amended pleadings?

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MS. CABRASER: Yes. Each of these grants -- and these are three proposed class representatives. They each have multiple NIH grants. All of those grants were active grants until the July 31st form letter. They were included in the list of 500 suspended grants, and all three of our researchers received a copy of that form letter and a stop work order under it. Several of those grants had been renewed as recently as June of 2025.

THE COURT: Let me give the Government an opportunity to respond as to Plaintiffs' good cause showing.

MR. ALTABET: Yes, Your Honor.

So to start, I think the real timeline here starts around six weeks prior to when Plaintiffs' letter brief was filed, and that was July 11th, when Plaintiffs affirmatively represented by email, quote, "We will be adding an NIH plaintiff, as we have confirmed there are a number of UC grants that are not meaningfully captured by the Massachusetts v. Kennedy injunction."

And that wasn't in a vacuum, Your Honor, in after a week of information sharing and negotiations over a stipulation to

add NIH grants to this case. So I think Plaintiffs' statement that there was some sort of surprise about the injunction that they discovered later is belied by the factual record here.

And frankly, 47 days ago, the parties had discussed the exact topic that they now seek to amend their complaint to cover, the named NIH plaintiff. And the leading case here, as Your Honor knows from probably prior cases dealing with good cause, is Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d 604, pincite 609, Ninth Circuit, 1992.

And in that case, the Court, Ninth Circuit, said that good cause means plaintiffs must make a showing of sufficient diligence in pursuing the topic of their proposed amendment after a scheduling order has passed.

And if we look at the proposed timeline here, there is no such diligence. And in fact, Johnson specifically discussed negotiations over a stipulation which would have added a defendant there, here obviously a named plaintiff, but the Ninth Circuit found that discussions of stipulations showed that there was a lack of sufficient diligence.

And here, Plaintiffs proposed a short deadline to add additional named plaintiffs. They proposed 25 days from the Court's preliminary injunction, which put them on notice that a named plaintiff would be required for injunctive relief for a defendant until July 18th, the deadline. You know, that was their choice, adopted by the Court.

And after that, Plaintiffs and Defendants got to work. On July 2nd, we shared detailed information, including about NIH grants involving the Massachusetts v. Kennedy injunction that they just cited.

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On July 8th, Plaintiffs stated that if we could come to an agreement on a stipulation, they would forego adding an NIH plaintiff, therefore trying to set out a negotiation about whether an NIH plaintiff would be included. And when, on July 11th, those stipulations were unsuccessful -- sorry. I'm getting a little bit of feedback, Your Honor.

On July 11th, Plaintiffs stated that they would be adding an NIH named plaintiff to the amended complaint. Now, seven days later, they did not do so. They added other named plaintiffs for other agencies, but they did not do so for NIH.

Now, Plaintiffs are, as the Court found in its order appointing them class counsel, premier attorneys in administrative law and constitutional law and class action issues, and they are familiar that a scheduling order is binding absent leave of court and that an amended pleading deadline is a really important date in a class action setup.

After that date, other litigation is going to be based on the content of the amended complaint. And here, the scheduling order is based on that amended complaint, whether it be administrative records, thousands of pages of which Defendants will be producing in a week for the five agency defendants for

which there are named plaintiffs, and then summary judgment deadlines and either a hearing or bench trial on December 16th in front of Your Honor. That's the current schedule.

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And Plaintiffs cite July 31st as the appropriate date, that on July 31st something new happened and that therefore they've exercised sufficient diligence. But it provides no excuse, and you can see that as early as June 4th, when they filed their original complaint. There, Plaintiffs alleged that terminations en masse would be ongoing at agencies that they named.

They specifically named NIH as an agency that they would allege was likely to continue terminating grants. They stated that NIH and NSF were the two most important institutions for the University of California system, therefore highlighting that they thought it was important to cover NIH.

And they stated in that complaint that specifically the anti-Semitism task force was likely to begin terminating grants or influencing agencies to terminate grants or making findings that would lead agencies to terminate or suspend grants based on the University of California system. And that's paragraph 430 in their original complaint.

And of course, the Court's order in June specifically adopted Plaintiffs' allegations in order to affirm their request for prospective relief for ongoing terminations, and then it left open whether Plaintiffs would add named plaintiffs

to cover additional agencies.

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I had one other point on diligence, and then I can move on, Your Honor. And that's just not only does that timeline matter for determining whether Plaintiffs provided sufficient diligence, but also that by their own date, July 31st, is the appropriate date where they were put on notice that they would want to add a named plaintiff.

And we are now nearly three weeks from that deadline, and Plaintiffs -- excuse me -- we're nearly three weeks from that deadline Plaintiffs first informed the Court that they were even suggesting adding an NIH named plaintiff outside of the scheduling order deadline.

And the fact that they didn't even inform the Court as they prepared three declarations by their own statement today, which means they found named plaintiffs, identified their grants, did factual research, created a new amended complaint — that's a substantial amount of work that nobody was aware of until Plaintiffs filed their letter brief on August 21st, where they stated in a suggestion that they would add an NIH named plaintiff.

That's not sufficient diligence.

THE COURT: One question I have for you is the three proposed new NIH named plaintiffs, as I understand it, had not had any kind of grant termination or suspension prior to July 31st. And of course, although Plaintiffs did allege that NIH

was continuing to terminate grants, no one could know whether NIH would terminate grants in a way that did not provide adequate information to the putative class members about -- whether NIH would do the same thing that it had done before was unknown to the plaintiffs.

So as I understand Plaintiffs' argument, they couldn't have added these three people earlier to the complaint before July 31st because nothing had happened to those folks yet, and now that something has happened to those folks, it is appropriate to add them to the complaint, and it does change the scope of the case for the reasons that you identified earlier.

And so they have been diligent in adding those three individuals at -- within a reasonable time frame after they suffered the injury at issue, which is three weeks prior to proposing the addition. What is your response to that?

MR. ALTABET: So a couple of points. The first is on diligence. Even in adding these NIH plaintiffs, I don't think that has been shown. The original 18 days between the Court's scheduling order and the deadline to amend the complaint -- right now Plaintiffs -- we'll get to proposals in a moment, but Plaintiffs are proposing around double that amount of time to amend their complaint to add NIH.

And again, no one was informed prior to the 21st about this course of action. So I think that itself belies a showing

of sufficient diligence. But even setting that aside, looking at Plaintiffs' knowledge on July 18th, based on Plaintiffs' allegations in the Court's order, everyone seems to agree that agencies that were not covered by the injunction had a likelihood of continuing to terminate grants based on the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint in en masse form terminations.

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So Plaintiffs' own allegations, their own very reason for this case, the reason they wanted, according to them, to amend the complaint to add additional agencies was for prospective relief to prevent future terminations of the kind they discuss.

And so at the time of July 18th, they had the motivation, they had the incentive, and they had the knowledge to cover this future action. The fact that something they predicted would happen did happen does not allow them to disrupt the scheduling order that they chose.

If that was true, then they could have proposed another round of amended complaints. They could have proposed things in a different way, but that's not what we did. We proposed a final termination of this case based on a strict schedule.

And there's also a prejudice prong that's separate from diligence, even if Your Honor finds diligence. There could be prejudice. And I'll just briefly note that under the schedule we have or the schedule we would make up, there would be significant prejudice. If the current schedule controls, we'll

have parallel tracks of litigation by necessity -- a different administrative record deadline, different summary judgment deadline, a different hearing or bench trial date.

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And if we modify the schedule, this orderly resolution both parties agreed to, knowing full well the situation would have to be modified so everyone gets the same administrative record at the same time. Everyone deals with summary judgment at the same time. And both would be burdensome, the very reason scheduling orders exist.

So I think all of that's to say, Your Honor, there is no good cause here, there's no reasonable diligence, and at the very least, there's substantial prejudice to this orderly proceeding that it's not proper for them to add an NIH named plaintiff at this time.

THE COURT: Let me give Plaintiffs an opportunity to respond as to the cause issue, and then I want to understand what the scheduling proposal is so I can assess the prejudice issue. But let's just stay with good cause for a moment.

MS. CABRASER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

So additional facts -- we did indeed have a potential NIH plaintiff. However -- but prior to the July 18th deadline. However, that grant was reinstated prior to the July 18th deadline, and that reassured everyone, certainly reassured the researchers, that the situation was stable.

So we were all surprised when we learned subsequently,

when we learned about the July 31st letter that, in fact, the opposite had happened. There had been an en masse suspension of NIH grants at UCLA. And indeed, that's really what we're focused on for the amended complaint. We're dealing with the group of NIH UCLA researchers whose grants were suspended en masse by that single form letter asserting the same claims as are presently asserted in the complaint.

So what is new and different about the case before and after that letter is that now we have an additional identified set of grants that have been suspended in one fell swoop by one letter. It was a surprise.

In fact, when we were before the Ninth Circuit on July 31st and the Court inquired as to why there had not been a stay request by another of the agencies, NSF, I believe, which also utilized, as you know, that suspension mechanism on the same day, we weren't given any information that would have alerted us to the fact that this has just happened.

And of course, we found out about it when the researchers themselves did and contacted us, which was several days after the fact when they got their stop work notice. So if days matter -- and they do here -- we were constrained by the timing that we had. It was a surprise.

I will note that amendments are freely given when justice so requires. I think this is a balancing act for the Court.

We understand the importance of case management orders. Every

litigator, you know, lives and dies with respect to case management orders. But they are also amended and refined as cases go on, particularly when cases gain new facts, add complexity.

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We are certainly willing to work with the Government. I think we've worked very well thus far, civilly, with courtesy with respect to proposed schedules. And in fact, we've had a number of emails back and forth on a proposed schedule for this next phase, and we are not very far apart in terms of days. It's mainly a matter of the Court's convenience in terms of scheduling the next hearing, and we're happy to go into the various positions on that.

But we are willing and able to get our amended complaint on file, get our pleadings on file in this matter by Friday of this week so as not to delay the rest of the case. I don't think we're going to have to proceed on different schedules in order to be fair to everyone, but if we do -- and I doubt that -- there is nothing unusual or atypical about a different schedules for different tracks.

And I will say this: One of the most difficult things, and one of the paradoxes of a class action is that it requires exceptional people with typical claims who are willing to be named and take a stand on behalf of others. The fear and concern over retaliation has been a live issue in this case.

It was a live issue with respect to the original named

plaintiffs. It was a live issue with respect to UCLA researchers who used several weeks to decide, to determine, to consider, based on, you know, all sorts of professional and personal and family considerations whether they could, in fact, come forward and be named and serve as class representatives, and they decided in the end in the affirmative.

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And as soon as that had occurred, we notified the DOJ and then notified this court on August 21st.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let's move to my other question about the parties' schedule, in the event that the Court were to permit amendment, how would that affect the schedule.

Let me hear first from Plaintiffs, since they're the ones proposing this modification. Tell me what the parties have discussed in terms of agreement and what the potential areas of disagreement are. And then I can hear the Government's position on that.

MS. CABRASER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. Elizabeth Cabraser. Let me try to recite the current situation.

It's Plaintiffs' position that we would be filing the amended complaint on Friday, August 29th, together with the motion for preliminary injunction and provisional class certification. Our position is that the defendants would have until Monday, September the 8th, to respond, and our reply,

Plaintiffs' reply, would be due on Friday, September the 12th.

By the way, as to the supplemental briefing, as to the impact of the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, I think the parties are in agreement on that with respect to proposing simultaneous briefs with a maximum of ten pages on Friday, September the 5th. And to get back to the complaint, our schedule contemplated that the hearing could be set on September 16th, but we are now aware, Your Honor, that you're unavailable on that day.

I think the Government's position would be to file the amended complaint on the 5th of September together with the motion for preliminary injunction and provisional class certification. The response of Defendants would be due September the 12th, which is a Friday. Our reply would be due Tuesday, September the 16th and with a hearing date of Tuesday, September 23rd.

But, again, those hearing dates really are based on the Court's schedule and the Court's convenience. So we're literally days apart on that schedule.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let me hear from Defendants. Anything additional you'd like the Court to know about the impact on the case schedule?

MR. ALTABET: No. I think that was an eloquent -- we realized right before the hearing that there were hearing dates blocked off on your calendar, and so I think probably we were

looking -- I guess the reason we want to start slightly later is so that we're sequential, since we agreed September 5th should be the supplemental briefs. We figured after supplemental briefing on the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, then we would start, if the Court were to grant their amendment, on the named NIH plaintiff.

MS. CABRASER: And Your Honor, with respect to that concept, we're happy to file on the 29th and, you know, allowing a reasonable time obviously for responses. That's -- we're not trying to jam Defendants at all on that. As I say, we were both working back from ideas on when the Court could hear us.

MR. ALTABET: You know, I guess one final point. The hardest part, at least for the Government, is that we have Labor Day weekend. Then all the administrative records are due on September 2nd. That's a pretty substantial day's production. It's thousands of documents. We have to get them all finished, Bates stamped, and into the Box folder. Then the supplemental brief is due September 5th.

So at least for us, sort of the later is better just so those can be sequential events.

THE COURT: I understand that. That makes sense.

In terms of the schedule, let's do August 29th for the plaintiffs to file the first amended complaint. This is the schedule, I think, that makes sense. I'm just talking about

this from a scheduling perspective, and I want to take your temperature on it from a scheduling perspective; then I'll go back to the Rule 16 issue.

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But if we were going to modify the schedule, it seems to me that Plaintiffs filing the first amended complaint and preliminary injunction and provisional class certification papers on August 29th would make sense.

I could give Defendants a few more days on the response in consideration of the need to prepare the administrative record and also the need to prepare the supplemental briefing on the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit rulings. So we could do that on September 10th instead.

And then I could put the plaintiffs' reply on the 15th,
September 15th, and we could have the hearing -- as it turns
out, I'm not available on September 16th or 23rd. But I could
special set you on Thursday, September 18th in the afternoon at
1:30. Just from a pure scheduling perspective -- then I'd
leave the simultaneous briefs on September 5th. From a pure
scheduling perspective, does that schedule work for the
parties?

Let me start with the plaintiffs.

MS. CABRASER: Yes, Your Honor, that schedule works for the plaintiffs.

**THE COURT:** And for the Government, Defendants?

MR. ALTABET: I think it would certainly work if the

hearing were on Zoom. Is that what the Court is contemplating?

I have to double-check for in person because I do have a

wedding that weekend. I need to see when I need to be there.

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THE COURT: I don't mind having it on Zoom.

Do the plaintiffs have any objection to having the hearing by Zoom?

MS. CABRASER: No, Your Honor. We understand the travel situation and folks' very busy schedules.

THE COURT: Great. So I think that makes sense in terms of the schedule that I would set.

And with respect to the Rule 16 issue, as you can tell from my question, I had some concern about whether there is good cause, but given that these are three new plaintiffs who are alleging injuries that occurred after the deadline for amended pleadings had passed, it does not seem to me that they could have anticipated what the form letter would have looked like in advance.

Although I understand the point that there was some anticipation that there were ongoing mass terminations and that was the basis for the injunctive relief request, I don't think that they could have diligently asserted that claim earlier.

And Plaintiffs have adequately shown that their prior proposed NIH plaintiff was no longer viable because that person had their grant reinstated, and it didn't seem likely that the government, after having the Court's opinion, would

re-terminate those grants in the same way, particularly after the issuance of the preliminary injunction. So I can understand why Plaintiffs did not make this motion to amend at an earlier time.

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I also don't see significant prejudice to having a later schedule for the production of the administrative record and the briefing on summary judgment and the argument on it. If the parties have a preference to consolidate the summary judgment briefing for efficiency, I'm open to a stipulation to do that.

If the parties think it makes more sense to proceed in seriatim, I'm okay with that too. I don't want to have a bench trial on these issues until I've entered a summary judgment ruling or determined that there are disputed issues that require a bench trial. If we have a bench trial, it will be all at once.

So we will probably need a revised schedule from the parties as to a proposed new bench trial date, and then I'll let you all meet and confer about whether you want to change the summary judgment date so that you only have to brief this once. That might be less burdensome for you all. I'm open to it one way or the other, whatever works best.

I think it makes sense to continue to have two administrative record dates so that the Government can provide what it has been preparing and then can provide an additional

set as to additional defendants if that's necessary, although it sounds as though you all have been working pretty hard on putting most of that together anyway.

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So it's hard for me to see the prejudice, especially since I need to take a pause anyway in terms of assessing the preliminary injunction order as to DOD and DOT while I hear from you all about the impact of the intervening Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions.

I need that before I can address the DOD and DOT injunctions anyway; so this isn't delaying that much more than we were already going to need to be delayed for me to digest that information. So I understand the concern, but I think we can mitigate any prejudice by adjusting the case deadlines if necessary to avoid duplicative work, and by the -- by keeping in place the existing administrative record deadline but allowing more time, obviously, to prepare the record as to new plaintiffs that are being added.

So I'm going to grant Plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint along the lines that we discussed with the schedules that we have those dates.

I will say that if it is helpful as you all are preparing the briefing on the effect of the Supreme Court's NIH ruling and the Ninth Circuit's denial of the motion to stay the preliminary injunction that was previously issued, it would be helpful for me, in terms of assessing the NIH ruling, to

understand the arguments that were made concerning the individual researchers in the NIH case.

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There are a couple plaintiffs in the NIH case that was before the Supreme Court who were individual researchers, but it did not appear to me, from my brief review of the papers in that case, that the plaintiffs argued either in the district court or in the subsequent appeals courts that they should be treated differently because they were individual researchers.

And so I don't know if the Supreme Court has really had an opportunity to weigh in on that issue or whether that argument was really waived by Plaintiffs in the NIH case out of Massachusetts, and it would be helpful for me to have your perspective on that issue as you're preparing the supplemental briefing.

I still have my outstanding question that I put out earlier about the estimate as to the number of active grants for DOD and DOT. I would like to get the information that you've prepared on that, assuming you have. But before I do that, I wanted to give you all an opportunity to let me know if there's anything else you think we should discuss with respect to the plaintiffs' proposed amendment to add NIH.

I'll start with Plaintiffs, and then I can hear from the defendants.

MS. CABRASER: No, Your Honor. Nothing further. We appreciate the ruling and the schedule. We also appreciate the

guidance on the focus of the supplemental briefing.

**THE COURT:** And the Government?

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MR. ALTABET: Nothing from the Government right now. We'll have to discuss and figure out a timeline.

THE COURT: And then let me ask you all, since I have you here. We had originally scheduled this for a hearing on the request to add -- or to issue a new injunction as to the Department of Defense and Department of Transportation.

And I asked the parties what is the parties' best estimate as to the total number of active grants awarded by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation where a University of California researcher is named as the principal researcher, investigator, or project leader on the grant application.

And I asked this because I have information about how many grants were terminated by those agencies, but I don't have a sense of how many grants there are out there. And what Plaintiffs are saying, that it's an injunctive relief issue and that there are potential ongoing mass terminations, as we discussed, that I think the number of active grants in general is important to the Court's analysis potentially. So I wanted to ask the parties about that.

I'll start with Plaintiffs, and then I can ask for any estimate from Defendants.

MS. CABRASER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Actually, I think our best answer to your question at this point actually comes from the Department of Justice. We did get a detailed email yesterday in response to our request that noted an estimated 717 active grants awarded by DOD to a University of California institution where a UC researcher is named as principal researcher on the grant at location, and the Government can explain how it gathered that information, its methodology.

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And with respect to the Department of Transportation, they identified 12 active grants under the University Transportation Center program that would have principal investigators from UC, and there are another six, I think, active research grants involving UC schools for other DOT research programs. So that would indicate, from the Government's information, 18 for DOT and then over 700 for DOD.

We don't have any better information than that, I don't think, but of course, the number of researchers involved is a multiple, usually, of the number of grants, if you include co -- you know, co-researchers on major grants.

THE COURT: And so it would be the plaintiffs' argument that DOT, even though it's only 18 grants that are currently active, that it's still enough for numerosity because it's likely that there are -- that's the number for situations where there's a grant with a principal researcher, and so for each grant, there are multiple UC researchers typically. So

we're looking at potentially, in terms of the putative class members, somewhere more like 18 times three?

2.4

MS. CABRASER: That would be correct, Your Honor, as a strict numerosity calculation, but of course, the rule actually relates to impracticability of individual joinder. And here especially, one of the barriers to individual joinder of all of those three dozen or so researchers as named plaintiffs is, as it often is in other discrimination or constitutional cases or even employment 23(b)(2) cases, a concern about retaliation.

So that's a very real, practicable barrier to individual joinder, even for a relatively small 23(b)(2) class.

THE COURT: Let me give the Government an opportunity to add any other detail or response to Plaintiffs' characterization.

MR. ALTABET: Sure. Just a couple clarifications.

So at the time to swap estimates, Plaintiffs informed us that they had no information, did not plan to make an estimate, and so we provided an estimate of 717 active grants for DOD.

That covers where a UC-related person is a principal researcher.

So DOD used 16 sort of UC search terms to identify that. Their system doesn't let them capture co-investigators or sub-positions and the like, so the sort of low estimate of principal research active grants is 717. There may be other grants, but we can say that safely.

DOT is kind of the reverse angle. DOT determined there were 12 in the UTC program where University of California was the lead university or a consortium member, but that doesn't tell us whether there's a UC relevant individual in a relevant position on the actual grant because of the mix.

Similarly -- we have six non-UTC grants where we identified a UC school was involved, but similarly, we have not identified whether or not someone is in a privileged position on those grants.

So in a way, the DOD is the low end of the possibility, and DOT is on the high end of the possibility from what we can tell, outside of a University of California researcher being on the grant to another school. So those are the UC grants that could be relevant for DOT.

THE COURT: Help me understand that UTC versus non-UTC distinction, just so I understand the facts.

MR. ALTABET: Sure.

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THE COURT: So as I understand it, you're saying UTC grants from DOT are situations where the University of California is the principal grantee. And there is a possibility, hypothetically, that University of California would be the grantee, but for some reason, none of the principal researchers, investigators, project leaders -- none of those people actually work at the University of California. So you're saying that 12 number could be an overestimate?

MR. ALTABET: Yeah, and it's kind of a weird -- as you can see, the named plaintiff has a UTC grant, the named Department of Transportation plaintiff. And you can see in those files, it's a bit of an odd situation. The UTC, which is sort of created another program, is either -- there's, like, a lead university or a consortium member, and this covers where UC is a lead university or a consortium member.

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The other six are just the more traditional grants we've seen for most of the other named plaintiffs, research topic, and there's principal investigators. It's sort of the standard situation.

So we split it up that way both because UTC was easier to identify. DOT's grant program is kind of disaggregated, and so we had to get responses from all of the different departments, but also because the grants look different.

THE COURT: So for the non-UTC category, the six that were identified are situations in which the grantee was the University of California and the principal researcher was someone from the University of California?

MR. ALTABET: We know a UC school is involved as a grantee or a sub-grantee, but we don't know if a UC individual is listed on the grant.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. I understand.

MR. ALTABET: In part because that disaggregation made it hard to sort of compile all of the information.

1 And I'll just add as to the sort of law here, I do think it's important -- and maybe this will be discussed more at the 2 3 later hearing, but here, the Court decided, at least based on its preliminary injunction order, that the final agency action 4 are the actual grant determinations. 5 6 I think the way the Court structured its order is that if 7 a termination were to occur, all the researchers become part of the class at that moment but not before. So it does seem odd 8 to include them for numerosity when they have no -- they're not 10 relevantly part of the class until a termination occurs. 11 just wanted to point out that issue to the extent it's useful 12 for the Court. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. That's helpful. Is there 14 anything else the parties would like to address with the Court 15 before we conclude today? 16 I'll give Plaintiffs an opportunity, and then the 17 Government. 18 MS. CABRASER: Nothing for Plaintiffs, Your Honor. 19 Thank you very much. 20 **THE COURT:** Okay. And the Government? 21 MR. ALTABET: It depends. Is Your Honor planning to 22 hold additional argument on the preliminary injunction,

 $\ensuremath{\mathbf{THE}}$   $\ensuremath{\mathbf{COURT}}\colon$  Yes. When we have our hearing on

including the issues that have just been briefed, in the

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future?

1	September 18th, my plan is to discuss both the preliminary	
2	injunction request as to DOD and DOT and the preliminary	
3	injunction request as to NIH, all three of those at the same	
4	time at the hearing.	
5	MR. ALTABET: Understood. We'll have additional	
6	argument then, Your Honor, and we have nothing else for now,	
7	other than we may reach out to chambers, cc'ing opposing	
8	counsel, about how to produce the administrative record to the	
9	Court, either through Box or some other system.	
10	MS. CABRASER: And, Your Honor, as always, we're happy	
11	to meet and confer about that. We will certainly meet and	
12	confer with respect to the scheduling issues that you	
13	identified for purposes of later proceedings to see if we can	
14	come up with a joint proposal.	
15	THE COURT: Great. Thank you. Be well.	
16	MS. CABRASER: Thank you.	
17	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Court is in recess.	
18	(The proceedings concluded at 2:16 P.M.)	
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# CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. DATE: Wednesday, August 27, 2025 April Wood Brott, CSR No. 13782